How it really was

The Watch on the Rhine: the British occupation of the Rhineland after World War One

14th September 2009

It’s intriguing how memories of the First World War and its aftermath influenced British people in occupied Germany at the end of the Second World War.

At the end of the First World War, French, British, Belgian and US troops occupied the Rhineland. This was agreed as part of the Armistice signed on November 11th 1918. The details, including zones of occupation, were worked out by the French Marshal Foch and the British were allocated the city of Cologne and surrounding area. British troops first crossed the frontier into Germany on 2nd December 1918.

The occupation was originally intended to last for 15 years, with the number of Allied troops reduced in stages after 5 and 10 years, subject to certain conditions being met. The British left Cologne in January 1926, but some troops stayed on in Wiesbaden until 30th June 1930.

Looking back to memories of the First World War and its aftermath helps to explain some of the ambivalence in British policy and attitudes towards the German people after the Second World War. On the one hand a concern not to be deceived again by a duplicitous people, who, so the story went, had courted sympathy from well-meaning Allied soldiers, claiming they were victims of an unjust peace settlement, while at the same time planning their revenge and preparing for war. But on the other hand, a concern that the Allies had also made some mistakes, and the economic depression, hunger and unemployment which followed the First World War should not be repeated, for fear that an even worse disaster may occur in the not so distant future.

As examples of the view that this time, in 1945, they had to “stay the course” and “do the job properly”, here are some extracts from three articles in early editions of the British Zone Review, the official journal of the British Military Government and Control Commission for Germany:

“Experiences of Rhineland Occupation: 1919-1925

You will not, I think, be surprised at my conclusions – that the occupation, intended as a measure for preventing their making war, was used by the Germans as a means of dividing the Allies and of getting their propaganda into the very heart of each of the Allied countries. Moreover we failed to see that Germany was only shamming dead economically and financially and was exploiting the situation to arouse a wholly unjustified sympathy and causing us serious trade difficulties, for which we would blame the peace settlement and our Allies.”
(British Zone review, October 13th 1945)

“Lessons of History

We set out to see whether there was a lesson to be learnt from history. It now stares us in the face. To cut down our occupying forces below an effective minimum or to let considerations of retrenchment weaken our control organisation would be to fly in the face of experience.”
(British Zone Review, November 24th 1945)

“Why Weimar failed

Behind the welter of political strife, the confusion of unversed and inept politicians, the militarists and industrialists waited and planned to avenge themselves of their defeat.”
(British Zone Review, December 22nd 1945)

On the other hand, if we look at contemporary accounts of the British occupation of the Rhineland after the First World War, written in the 1920s rather than in 1945, we find that the troops generally got on well with the local population, and in many cases returned home “definitely pro-German.” Violet Markham, who spent two years in Germany with her husband, who was chief demobilization officer for the British Army of the Rhine, wrote in her book 'A Woman’s Watch on the Rhine' published in 1921, that “Life in Cologne is very pleasant for the occupying army” and “surely no Army of Occupation was ever so well housed or so comfortable as we are.” On first crossing the border into Germany, she remarked that “It is almost with a shock you realise that German civilians are not equipped with hoofs and horns or other attributes of a Satanic character” and she soon came to see people as individuals, rather than as the stereotypes promoted by governments in wartime:

“It is easy to hate the abstraction called Germany, but for individual Germans one feels either like, dislike or indifference the same as for other people.”

Although she had no doubts as to the “noble ideal” for which the British had fought the war, and was irritated at Germany’s “refusal to say she is sorry”, she was also critical of Allied post-war policy; especially the continuation of the economic blockade; and the Treaty of Versailles, which she said had “scrapped the fundamental ideals for which we fought the war.”

In her view, the democratic government which emerged in Germany in 1918 had an impossible task as it was “confronted by hunger, defeat, despair, and the miseries which resulted from the blockade” and the Allies were partly to blame for the rise of the extreme parties and the decline in the vote for the Social Democrats in the elections of 1920:

“The party standing for ordered democratic development had been knocked out. The British public should try to realise it has been killed by the Allied policy.”

She was not optimistic for the future. In a prediction, which may have seemed extravagant at the time, but which turned out to be unpleasantly close to the truth, she wrote that:

“The post-war chaos appears so complete that men turn from it in despair. Moral disillusion and weariness have their counterparts in recklessness and wild extravagance. There is a sense of an approaching Twilight of the Gods; of a collapse of the foundations of society.”

Perhaps surprisingly, it seems that official British policy after the Second World War, at least as implemented by those on the ground in Germany, was influenced as much by this second strand of thought, of the need to avoid hunger, despair and unemployment, as by concerns that German militarists would re-arm and seek their revenge. This can be traced in the papers of General Sir Brian Robertson, arguably the most influential British soldier and administrator in Germany after the end of the war. His father, General, later Field-Marshal, Sir William Robertson had been Chief of the Imperial General Staff during the First World War and for a time, in 1919, Military Governor of the British occupied part of the Rhineland.

In a speech in November 1939, when he was President of the Natal Chamber of Industries in South Africa, well before he had any idea of his future role in post-war Germany, Brian Robertson looked forward to the end of the war, saying:

“This war, so far at least, is very unlike the last. It is equally certain that the peace treaties, which have yet to be made, will be quite unlike those which ended the last war. Those treaties were failures because they were based upon fear and vindictiveness. The next treaties, if they are to give lasting peace, must be founded upon confidence and generosity, and they must strike at the root causes of international unrest. Chief among these causes is that economic nationalism which has grown up like a rank week to stifle the national flow of trade between nations.”

Many years later in 1965, in a speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Brian Robertson referred to his experience as a member of the British delegation at the League of Nations in Geneva in 1932-3 and how this had made him: “a first hand witness of the failure to deal properly with Germany after World  War 1.” He continued by saying:

“My father had been Military Governor for a period then. He often talked to me about the mistakes and problems of those years. ‘The idea that you can hold down a country like Germany with her face in the dust indefinitely is a foolish one’ he used to say.”

If it was not possible to 'hold Germany down' for ever, there had to be an alternative policy to one that was purely negative, based on disarmament, demilitarisation and economic controls. In an article in the British Zone Review in October 1945, Robertson tried to explain his own personal philosophy, which suggested he had learnt a different 'lesson from history' from the other articles I quoted earlier in this posting. The analogy Robertson used was that of education: the German people had to be treated as one would treat a child. Firstly it was necessary to be stern, as the child had “inherited some very bad qualities from its parents”. But secondly it was necessary to be just, as:

“Lack of justice towards the Germans will bring us no profit but will evoke a spirit of embitterment and martyrdom which is as certain to lead to a desire for revenge as it did during the years which followed the First World War. Starvation and disease are not suitable punitive measures.”

In a talk he gave in December 1945 at a conference of British Army Corps Commanders, who at the time also acted as regional governors, responsible for all aspects of Military Government in their areas, Robertson gave his view of the attitudes of the four Allies in Germany, claiming that it was only the British who had a constructive policy. The French were concerned above all with their own security and the Russians with the payment of reparations. The Americans went from one extreme to the other and “their main contribution to Quadripartite government is to produce a series of unpractical laws which have very little bearing on the main problems.” The British were, in his view: “the only power that really cares what happens to Germany. We flatter ourselves that we can regenerate her. Probably we feel instinctively that our interests will not best be served by turning Germany into a helpless desert.”

References:

David G. Williamson, The British in Germany 1918-1930: the Reluctant Occupiers (New York, Oxford: Berg, 1991)

David Williamson, A Most Diplomatic General: The life of General Lord Robertson of Oakridge (London, Washington: Brasseys, 1996)

Violet Markham, A Woman’s Watch on the Rhine (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 1921)

 

Justum et tenacem propositi virum – the wise man, firm of purpose

26th October 2008

With the start of a new academic term, I’ve restarted posting on this blog, which aims to record my thoughts, ideas, and, I hope, some insights and discoveries, as I work my way through a six year, part time PhD project, on the British in Occupied Germany after World War Two. The approach I’ve adopted, for the time being at least, is to ‘Follow the People’. I’ve identified around 20 people I think are interesting for one reason or another, and am trying to find out as much about them as I can.

In my last post, I referred to General Sir Brian Robertson, Deputy Military Governor of the British Zone of Occupation, writing in January 1946, at the end of an article in the British Zone Review, the official journal of British Military Government and the Control Commission for Germany, that he and his colleagues in the British Control Commission should take as their motto “a line written many centuries ago by wise friend Horace:”

Justum et tenacem propositi virum

During a recent visit to the archives at the Imperial War Museum, I was surprised to find Robertson saying the same thing two years later, this time to journalists at a press conference on 22nd December 1947:

“I remember when I first came to Germany, somewhat to the alarm of the staff I asked them to refresh their memories about the opening lines of the ode by the poet Horace which began:

‘Justum et tenacem propositi virum’

If you want to know what I think should be our attitude in Germany then I recommend to you to read those lines yourselves.”

As I said then, this quotation brought home to me just how much has changed in the last sixty years. Could you imagine a modern British (or American, or French or German or Italian) Commander-in-Chief quoting the first line of a Latin ode, not only to his staff, but to journalists at a press conference, and expect his readers and listeners to know and understand the rest of the poem?

The full quotation from Horace can be translated as:

“The just man, firm of purpose cannot be shaken in his rocklike soul, by the heat of fellow citizens clamouring for what is wrong, nor by the presence of a threatening tyrant.”

What can this tell us about the British in Germany after the war, who they were and what they aimed to achieve?

The just man firm of purpose, presumably, is the British officer in the Control Commission and Military Government. The fellow citizens clamouring for what is wrong and trying to shake him in his rock-like soul would appear to be their critics at home in the UK, in the press, in parliament, maybe even in the British government. The threatening tyrant could be Stalin, or could be the shadow of Hitler, or both.

Firstly, it seems to me, this reveals the supreme self-confidence of many of the British. Winning the war had demonstrated not only their physical, but also their moral superiority and, in their view, the superiority of the British way of life, government and society in general. As Michael Balfour, another general in the war and administrator in occupied Germany afterwards, said in the introduction to his history of the period, the book was written “from the standpoint of a British liberal democrat, to whom the political forms evolved in Britain and America seem the most satisfactory yet devised by man…”

Secondly, the audience Robertson was addressing was middle and upper class, educated men like himself, who, whether they were now army officers, civil administrators or journalists in the press, had all learnt their Latin at British public (ie private) schools. Because they shared the same upbringing and education, Robertson could assume, rightly or wrongly, that these men knew what was right, without having to be told.

Thirdly, by drawing on a classical tradition that was not unique to Britain, he could open the way to a common understanding with people in Germany who shared, or appeared to share, the same tradition. The first step towards reconciliation is to emphasise what people have in common, rather than what keeps them apart.

And fourthly, after the end of the war, the dangers against which the British officer - the just man, firm of purpose - had to guard, would appear to come, in his view, not so much from resistance or opposition from the German people, but from fellow citizens at home, who failed to understand the importance of the task and what he and his colleagues were trying to achieve, and from the threat of tyranny, represented on the one hand by a possible revival of German nationalism and on the other by the threat of Communism.

In practice, official British policy, as determined by the politicians in Westminster and the civil servants in Whitehall, came to be governed by concerns as to the cost of the occupation to the British taxpayer, and a desire to hand back responsibility for all aspects of government to German people as quickly as possible. The tensions between high and noble objectives, expressed by General Sir Brian Robertson and many other British officers and administrators in Germany, and the mundane practical concerns of those at home, is something that, to my mind, makes this a fascinating subject to study.

Potsdam 1945 to Western Germany 1965: A Miracle?

24th November 2007

Last week I wrote briefly about Sir Brian Robertson, probably the most influential British soldier and administrator in Germany after World War 2. He was Deputy Military Governor from 1945 to 1947 and Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor from 1947-49.

I've now read the article he wrote for the journal International Affairs in 1965, in which he tries to answer the question whether the British and American occupation of Germany "all worked out successfully"?

As I said in my first post on this blog two years ago, in my view, the role of the historian is not to judge the past. Who are we to say, with the benefit of hindsight, what people should or should not have done, especially when they lived and worked in places and times which were far more difficult and dangerous than our own, and which we can understand only imperfectly?

In this view I follow the great 19th century German historian Leopold von Ranke, whose words 'how it really was' (wie es eigentlich gewesen), I used for the name of this blog. The full quotation is worth repeating:

"Man hat der Historie das Amt, die Vergangenheit zu richten, die Mitwelt zum Nutzen zukünftiger Jahre zu belehren, beigemessen: so hoher Ämter unterwindet sich gegenwärtiger Versuch nicht: er will blos zeigen, wie es eigentlich gewesen."

This translates into English as:

The role, commonly attributed to History, is to judge the Past, to instruct the Present, for the benefit of the Future: such a high (noble) role is not claimed for this essay: it aims simply to show how it really was.

Rather than attempting to judge the past, what I try to do is discover and reveal, as best I can, how people in the past portrayed their work, their actions and their ideas, in their own terms and according to their own standards.

To return to Sir Brian Robertson and his article on whether the British and US Occupation of Germany was a success or not. The article was written in 1965 at the height of the Cold War. I've quoted a few extracts below. To my mind, they are interesting because they show, firstly, Robertson saying how the situation in Germany at the end of the war was completely different from what people in Britain and the US had expected and planned for, and secondly, looking back in 1965, his view of the 'miracle' that had happened in Western Germany in the previous 20 years.

"I was Field Marshal Montgomery's deputy for Military Government in Germany in 1945. Later I succeeded to the top position. I remained in Germany for five years, becoming High Commissioner in 1949, instead of Military Governor, when the Federal German Government was set up...."

"All things being considered ... [the occupation] has been surprisingly successful ... When I say 'all things being considered', I chiefly have in mind that the plans which were made for dealing with Germany after victory had been won were based on a series of complete misrepresentations as to what the real problem would be..."

"As for the men who came from the United States and from this country to confer in Teheran, Quebec, Yalta and Potsdam, [President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill and their advisors, at the Allied summits held during and immediately after the war], they had an entirely false picture in their minds as to what the situation would be in Germany, and they were aiming at a completely wrong objective. I do not say this in criticism. I do not for a moment claim that you of I might have been wiser if we had been in their shoes. I merely state what I believe to be the fact...."

"But the first discovery which I made, and made very quickly, [when he arrived in Germany in July 1945, two months after the end of the war], was that the men on the spot had their minds on other things. Very soon I could see that the assumptions on which our policy had been based were false, and that the objectives chosen were quite irrelevant. The real menace for the future of Europe and to world peace was not Germany, but Russia. The immediate objective was not to batter Germany down - she was sprawling in the dust already - but too build her up and to do so wisely. We had to save Germany physically from starvation, squalor and penury, spiritually from despair and Communism."

"Montgomery's agile mind had of course seen this clearly. His chief staff officer was Gerald Templer, a man whom I had always liked and respected. He was quite clear about the real state of affairs and I was glad to persuade him to join me as my Deputy...."

"Very soon we were driven by events to take action to restore the German economy in a manner that had certainly not been contemplated at Potsdam. The Germans in the British and American Zones were starving. Food had to be imported in large quantities and very obviously the German economy had to be geared to pay the bills... The war had wrecked the German economy ... It was in this appalling situation that a partnership was born between the occupiers and the occupied, a partnership with a common objective - to rebuild the German economy as fast as possible...."

"Western Germany today is a prosperous and contented country with a stable and democratic governmental system. She is a loyal member of NATO, a sincere partner in the European Economic Community ... There are no signs of a recrudescence of militarism of Nazi-ism...."

"If the authors of the series of agreements which culminated at Potsdam could have foreseen these days, they would no doubt have found the picture in many respects very satisfactory. In fact they deserve precious little credit for the good results, and they were greatly to blame for what was not so good. Wise statesmanship wilts in the over-heated atmosphere of victory...."

"Where then does the credit belong? Some of it should, in fairness, be ascribed to the innate decency and Christian charity of the Anglo-Saxon peoples. At the sight of starving Germany their consciences rebelled and that was the start of it. Much credit must [also] go to the German people ...

"National characteristics made possible miraculous results, but there will be no miracle unless the men are forthcoming to lead the nations. As I look back on the past 20 years I can see without any doubt that it has been the intervention of certain leading men that has been decisive for good.... the real miracle has been that they were found when they were most needed."

"There are those today who tell us that God does not intervene in human affairs, and that it is wrong to expect Him to do so. When with my simple mind I look back to Potsdam, 1945, and forward to Western Europe in 1965, it just seems to me that a cleverer hand has been at work than any hand of man."

Sir Brian Robertson - General Lord Robertson of Oakridge

Sir Brian Robertson, later enobled as Baron Robertson of Oakridge, was probably the most influential British soldier and administrator in Germany during the occupation. He was Deputy Military Governor from 1945 to 1947 and promoted to Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor from 1947-49. After the formation of an independent West German Government, he was the first UK High Commissioner in Germany, from 1949-50.

His career is comparable in some ways to that of Lucius D. Clay, who was initially Deputy Military Governor, then Military Governor, of the US Zone. Clay is now much better known, in part because of his role during the Berlin air lift and also because his book, Decision in Germany, first published in 1950, is still essential reading for anyone interested in the history of the period.

Unlike Clay, Robertson never published his memoirs, and, as far as I know, never wrote about his time in Germany. (Apart from a talk he gave at Chatham House in 1965, published in International Affairs, Vol. 41, No. 3)

Very little seems to have been written about him by historians, although there is an interesting oral history interview on the web, conducted in 1970 for the Harry S. Truman Presidential Library. The interview is worth reading in full, but I'll quote one passage here, where Robertson compared himself to General Clay:

"General Clay was a very powerful character....  I am not such a strong character, perhaps, but maybe I have a way of getting my own way. However it may be, it is certain that policy in Germany, in fact, emanated very largely from General Clay and myself." (Oral History Interview with General Lord Robertson of Oakridge, 11th August 1970 by Theodore A. Wilson (Harry S. Truman Library & Museum)